No Recusal For Judge with Ties to the Wife’s Father in Divorce Action

Tennessee law case summary on judicial recusal in divorce and family law from the Court of Appeals.

In re Jacob H.C. — no recusal of judge with personal relationship with father of wife

This appeal was from the denial of a motion to recuse filed by B. C., father of Jacob H.C. (“father”), who had initiated a proceeding to modify child support.  S.B.C., mother of Jacob (“mother”), filed an answer to the petition and a counter-petition seeking to have father held in civil contempt.  Father filed a motion asking the court to recuse itself in accordance with Tennessee Court Rules.  The motion was accompanied by the affidavit of father’s wife.  After a hearing, the court denied the motion and detailed the basis of the decision, which was appealed.  Father asserted that the trial judge was a personal friend of and had a business relationship with mother’s father (“grandfather”) who was an officer with the Brentwood Police Department.  As a result, he said that the judge’s impartiality might be reasonably questioned within the meaning of state court rules.

The affidavit of father’s wife described a meeting with the judge in Williamson County Juvenile Court.  While waiting outside the courtroom with grandfather, the trial judge appeared from chambers.  Grandfather addressed the judge by her first name.  The judge went to retrieve some papers, and upon her return, grandfather spoke to her again, congratulating her for her appointment to the bench.  He said he was “glad that he could help” and asked when she was getting sworn in.  He wanted to attend the ceremony.  Also in her affidavit, father’s wife observed that the judge did not appear to want to have a long conversation, and looked to be in a rush or uncomfortable with the conversation.  However, during this conversation, she said it was apparent from their and how they addressed each other and interacted that they knew each other personally and were friends.

Father’s affidavit stated that the trial judge presided over certain aspects of the paternity proceeding as a Juvenile Court Magistrate, and that grandfather was present through those proceedings.  Neither father nor his counsel was advised of the friendship.  At the hearing on the motion, the judge stated that they did know each other and had worked together for 16 years.  The judge claimed she could be impartial because she hadn’t seen grandfather for about eight years. The judge said that she knew many police officers, and she believed that she could be fair and impartial in this matter just as for anyone else that walked into her courtroom.

In his petition, father argued that the fact that the judge knew grandfather for 16 years and was on a first name basis with him gave the appearance of impropriety.  He further contended that the statement of grandfather, as recounted in father’s wife’s affidavit, “that he was ‘glad that he could help’ or words to that effect” and to “invite himself to the swearing in ceremony” undermined his confidence in the impartiality of the judge.  Father alleged specific concerns arising under the Rules of Judicial Conduct, which state that a judge “shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”

The court of appeals said that the necessity that litigants have confidence in the impartiality of judges is fundamental, and the principle is reflected in the state constitution, as well as the Code of Judicial Conduct.  The courts have also recognized that the preservation of the public’s confidence in judicial neutrality requires not only that the judge be impartial in fact, but also that the judge be perceived to be impartial. Thus, even when a judge believes that he or she can hear a case fairly and impartially, the appellate court said that the judge should recuse himself or herself if “the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”

The court of appeals explained that the test of whether there is a reasonable basis for questioning a judge’s impartiality is an objective one.  Recusal, the appellate court explained, is appropriate “when a person of ordinary prudence in the judge’s position, knowing all of the facts known to the judge, would find a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality.”  Here the court of appeals held that there was no evidence alleged or shown in the record, other that the fact that the judge had known the father of one of the litigants for a number of years and worked with him in a professional capacity, which would give rise to a basis to question the judge’s impartiality. The judge’s explanation that, in her former position as a prosecutor and lawyer in private practice, she came into contact with grandfather, a police officer in the county in which the judge sits, raised no concerns of judicial impropriety within the scope of the Rules of Judicial Conduct in hearing a case involving the grandfather’s daughter.  The mere fact that the judge worked with grandfather in the past, the court of appeals held, did not support a determination that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

The appellate court said that father’s contentions relative to the Rules of Judicial Conduct were not supported by the record, as the rule pertained to a “party” or “party’s lawyer.” Grandfather, who has the disqualifying relationship with the judge, was not a party to the proceedings, and there was no fact in the record and no allegation that his mere presence at hearings involving his daughter in any way influenced the judge or any ruling. The vague statement that grandfather was of some help in the judge’s appointment was not sufficient to raise a concern that disqualification was required by the Rules of Judicial Conduct.  The record did not give any factual support to father’s argument that the judge should be disqualified.  As a result, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying the motion for recusal and remanded the case for further proceedings.

No. M2013-00699-COA-10B-CV, 2013 WL 1200347 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2013).

See original opinion for exact language.  Legal citations omitted.

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